Abstract. Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocations obtained by any continuous sharing rule contains Pareto e‰cient allocations. We also present a mechanism that implements in Nash equilibrium the Pareto e‰-cient allocations contained in an arbitrary sharing rule.
Introduction
Consider a group of people owning a technology which transforms a possibly heterogeneous input (labor) into a homogeneous output (consumption). Inputs are also provided by the owners. Di¤erent proposals on how to distribute the output can be found in the literature.
In the class of environments in which the input is homogenous, Roemer and Silvestre (1988) proposed the Proportional Solution and the Equal Benefit Solution and Mas-Colell (1980) proposed the Constant Returns Equivalent Solution. Several characterizations of these solutions are provided in Moulin (1990) , Moulin and Roemer (1989) , and Maniquet (1996) . When heterogenous inputs are considered, other solutions have been proposed: Equal Sharing,
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Marginal Cost Rule, Aumann-Shapley Prices, Reference Welfare Equivalent Budget, etc. (see Aumann and Shapley 1974; Billera and Heath 1982; Moulin 1987; Tauman 1988; Pfingsten 1991 and Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1996) .
In this paper we focus our attention on contracts that are o¤ered to the owners of the inputs. We assume that the quantity of inputs is contractible but preferences are not. These contracts, that we will call Sharing Rules, are a function that specifies the list of consumptions depending on input contributions. The sharing rule together with the quantity of inputs determine income distribution inside the firm (the idea of expressing the share of output in terms of the inputs first appeared in Moulin 1990, p. 445) . It is worth to notice that all solutions mentioned above qualify as Sharing Rules except the constant return equivalent solution. Our analytical task consists in checking which Sharing Rules satisfy two basic requirements: E‰ciency and Implementability.
Firstly, we focus attention on those Sharing Rules which are compatible with Pareto e‰ciency, in the sense that there are allocations which are Pareto e‰cient and the input-output combination belongs to the sharing rule. We call those sharing rules E‰cient Sharing Rules. It is well known that the proportional and the equal benefit solutions are E‰cient Sharing Rules. We generalize these results by showing that any continuous sharing rule is an e‰cient sharing rule in the set of classical economies (continuous and convex preferences). Our proof is inspired by the proof of Negishi (1960) of the existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium.
Secondly, we consider the incentive properties of e‰cient sharing rules. A sharing rule that gives incentives to distort preferences or productivities can not be regarded as satisfactory. Roemer (1988) , Gevers (1986) and Maniquet and Fleurbaey (1996) showed respectively that the proportional, the equal benefit and the reference welfare equivalent budget e‰cient sharing rules are Nash implementable,1 i.e. there is a mechanism whose Nash equilibrium strategies generate the desired allocations. Suh (1995) introduced a mechanism that implements the proportional solution in Nash, undominated Nash and Strong equilibria. Shin and Suh (1997) provide a simple mechanism which doubly implements a class of solutions in Nash and strong equilibrium. In this paper we provide a simple mechanism that implements in Nash equilibrium every e‰cient sharing rule in the set of classical economies when there are at least three individuals.2 We assume that the planner knows the sharing rule but not the preferences of the agents that determine the set of Pareto e‰cient allocations for each economy. Our procedure has the advantage over Shin and Suh's that our conditions on the solutions to be implemented are easy to check and they include economies with heterogeneous inputs, but the disadvantage that we only implement in Nash equilibrium.
In our mechanism, people are arranged in a circle and each agent proposes the amount of input supplied by him and the agent next to him. Three cases are then identified: First, when the amount of input proposed by each agent coincides with the amount suggested by his monitor. In this case the mechanism distributes the output according to the sharing rule.
Second, when there are, at most, two consecutive agents whose proposals di¤er from what was proposed for them. Then, the agent with the lowest index (the dissident) has the right to choose an allocation in a certain budget set that is only profitable if he has deviated from a non e‰cient allocation. Since a deviation can only happen if the monitor of the dissident has tried to fool the mechanism, the monitor is severely fined: he gets zero consumption and has to contribute with the maximum amount of labor. All other agents obtain some arbitrary bundle.
Third, for any other message it is not possible to identify the dissident. In this case, the mechanism divides the agents into two groups: the ones that consume but do not work, and the ones that work but do not consume. Notice that, contrarily to what happens in the canonical mechanism, agents do not play integer games.
Our construction avoids some of the criticism made by Jackson (1992) to canonical mechanisms, since the strategy sets are compact.
The model and the main results
There is one consumption good produced from a vector of possibly heterogenous inputs using a publicly owned technology.
There are n individuals indexed by i. Let N ¼ f1; . . . ; ng. They are endowed with l A R þ , units of input.3 Each individual consumption set is defined by:
is agent i's consumption and l i is input contribution. Each agent has preferences defined on X, that can be represented by a utility function
The utility function is assumed to be di¤erentiable, concave, strictly increasing in x i and strictly decreasing in l i . Thus arg min
The technology is represented by a production function
The function f is continuous, increasing in each component, concave, continuously di¤erentiable in each component and with f ð0; . . . ; 0Þ ¼ 0.
We define the feasible set, denoted by X as follows
A feasible allocation is denoted by ðx; lÞ A X where x ¼ ðx 1 ; : : ; x n Þ and l ¼ ðl 1 ; . . . ; l n Þ.
We assume that X is fixed and utility functions vary. Thus, an economy, denoted by u ¼ ðu 1 ; . . . ; u n Þ, is a list of utility functions satisfying the assumptions listed above. The set of admissible economies is denoted by E.
The Pareto e‰cient solution j E : E ! X associates to each economy in the domain the set of Pareto e‰cient allocations for this economy. Formally,
A Sharing Rule is a contract that specifies the consumptions as a function of input contributions. Formally, a sharing rule P ¼ ðP 1 ; . . . ; P n Þ is a collection of functions such that
n . Each P i yields the consumption of i as a function of l. Moreover, P distributes the total output. Some examples of solutions that can be expressed as sharing rules are the following:
The Proportional Solution in which the sharing rule is:
where the amount of output consumed by an agent is proportional to the amount of input that he contributes. The Equal Benefit Solution, in which the sharing rule is:
where each agent consumes according to the budget constraint in the Walrasian equilibrium with equal profits. Clearly, other rules of profit distribution also qualify as sharing rules. The Equal Sharing Solution, in which the sharing rule is:
where each agent consumes an equal part of the total output. The Aumann-Shapley prices, in which for a vector of heterogenous input contributions, the sharing rule is:
where each agent consumes proportionally to the contribution of his input to the total production. When the input is homogenous it coincides with the proportional sharing rule. Furthermore, the family of methods proposed by Moulin (1987) also qualify as sharing rules. These sharing rules are:
For each m A R þ ,
For each l A ½0; 1,
For each l A ½0; 1Þ,
where a is the unique solution to:
Finally, note that every convex combination of the mentioned solutions, is also a sharing rule.
We assume that every sharing rule verifies that if l i ¼ l, P i ðl 1 ; :: l; l iþ1 ; :: l n Þ > 0. Note that all the mentioned sharing rules satisfy this assumption.
Pareto e‰ciency and Sharing Rules
In the sequel we will be interested in the intersection between the Pareto e‰-cient allocations j E and those satisfying a sharing rule P. Those allocations will be called E‰cient Sharing Rules and are denoted by j PE where: j PE ðu; PÞ ¼ fðx; lÞ A j E ðuÞ : x i ¼ P i ðlÞ; Ei A Ng:
We now prove that j PE ðu; PÞ 0 q, provided that P is continuous.
Theorem 1. Given u A E and a continuous sharing rule P, then j PE ðu; PÞ 0 q.
This maximization defines a correspondence denoted by f, such that
By concavity of u and convexity of X, f is convex valued. By Berge's maximum theorem, f is upper hemicontinuous. We define D i : R þ Â ½0; l n ! R for each i A N as follows:
Fix a feasible allocation ðx x;l lÞ and consider the following maximization program:
by compactness of D n 1 and continuity of the objective function on a i , there always exists a solution to this problem. This maximization defines a correspondence denoted by F, such that
where F is convex valued and upper hemicontinuous by Berge's maximum Theorem (remember that each D i is continuous on ðx i ; l i Þ). Now consider the following mapping
This is an upper hemicontinuous mapping from a compact convex set into itself, with non empty and convex values. By Kakutani's fixed point Theorem, there exists a fixed point ða Ã ; x Ã ; l Ã Þ. Notice that it is impossible to have ðx It can be easily checked that under our assumptions all the rules mentioned before are continuous (for Aumann-Shapley prices, see Mirman and Tauman 1980) . Thus, those sharing rules are e‰cient sharing rules.
Implementation of E‰cient Sharing Rules
A mechanism G is a list fðS i Þ i A N ; gg where S i is the strategy space for agent i and g is the outcome function, mapping each strategy profile into an element of the feasible set:
The outcome received by each agent is g i ðsÞ ¼ ðx i ; l i Þ.
Let s i be the list of strategies for all the agents except for i, then, the set of Nash equilibria of the game ðG; uÞ is denoted by NEðG; uÞ.
NEðG; uÞ
We say that a mechanism implements j PE in Nash equilibrium when it verifies that:
NEðG; uÞ 0 q j PE ðu; PÞ ¼ gðNEðG; uÞÞ; Eu A E:
For each continuous sharing rule P, let the mechanism GðPÞ be as follows:
The strategy space of agent i is S i ¼ ½0; . This is a particular instance of a ''Tweed Ring '' mechanism.4 The outcome function is divided into three cases which we denote as rules: The interpretation of this mechanism is the following: In Rule 1 each individual is given the share of the total output according to the sharing rule P.
Rule 2 applies when one individual deviates. Notice that the maximization problem for the dissident agent is
considering interior solutions, the first order condition to this problem is a necessary condition for an e‰cient allocation:
and it is su‰cient if this equality is verified for every agent. Thus, if the announcement of the rest of agents does not lead to a Pareto e‰cient allocation, one individual can increase his payo¤ deviating.5 Also, Rule 2 punishes the individual who did not monitor adequately. The punished individual is given his worst allocation. If the consumption proposed by the dissident is not feasible, we give him all the output. In Rule 3, the mechanism divides the agents into two groups: Those announcing s i ¼ ð0; 0Þ who consume and do not work, and those announcing s i 0 ð0; 0Þ who work but do not consume. As we next show, there is always an agent of this second group that strictly improves by means of a deviation.
Theorem 2. If n b 3, the mechanism GðPÞ implements j PE ðu; PÞ in Nash equilibrium.
Proof. First, let us show that j PE ðu; PÞ J gðNEðGðPÞ; uÞÞ Eu A E. Let ðx; lÞ A j PE ðu; PÞ for some u A E and some P, let s A Q 5 It can be shown that for non interior solutions, Rule 2 also gives incentives to deviate from a non e‰cient allocation, since individuals can trade leisure for consumption at a rate equal to the marginal rate of transformation.
Since ðx; lÞ is not e‰cient, there is at least one agent for whom the marginal rate of substitution is greater (or lower) than the marginal rate of transformation. Then, announcing a lower (respectively higher) input contribution, he improves his payo¤. This contradicts that s A NEðGðPÞ; uÞ. We conclude therefore, that there is no Nash equilibrium in Rule 3. 9
The proposed mechanism satisfies some nice properties: The message space consists of announcements of input contributions. Furthermore, participants contribute, in equilibrium, with the amount they announce (a similar property is called Forthrightness by Saijo et al. 1996) .
Final comments
In this paper we have shown that any continuous sharing rule is compatible with e‰ciency and incentives. In this sense, our results suggest the existence of a large degree of freedom concerning income distribution within the firm, unless other consideration are introduced. We would like to remark that shirking by workers is never reported as a concern in studies of cooperatives in the real world: observers report that workers monitor each other successfully (see Bonin et al. 1993) . This is precisely what happens in our mechanism.
Finally, see Corchó n and Puy (1998) for a study of sharing rules yielding individually rational allocations and sharing rules that arise from voting inside the firm.
